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ABSTRACT
It has been shown that adversaries can craft example inputs to neu-
ral networks which are similar to legitimate inputs but have been
created to purposely cause the neural network to misclassify the
input. These adversarial examples are crafted, for example, by cal-
culating gradients of a carefully defined loss function with respect
to the input. As a countermeasure, some researchers have tried to
design robust models by blocking or obfuscating gradients, even in
white-box settings. Another line of research proposes introducing
a separate detector to attempt to detect adversarial examples. This
approach also makes use of gradient obfuscation techniques, for
example, to prevent the adversary from trying to fool the detector.
In this paper, we introduce stochastic substitute training, a gray-box
approach that can craft adversarial examples for defenses which
obfuscate gradients. For those defenses that have tried to make
models more robust, with our technique, an adversary can craft ad-
versarial examples with no knowledge of the defense. For defenses
that attempt to detect the adversarial examples, with our technique,
an adversary only needs very limited information about the defense
to craft adversarial examples. We demonstrate our technique by
applying it against two defenses which make models more robust
and two defenses which detect adversarial examples.
ACM Reference Format:
Mohammad Hashemi, Greg Cusack, and Eric Keller. 2018. Stochastic Substi-
tute Training: A Gray-box Approach to Craft Adversarial Examples Against
Gradient Obfuscation Defenses. In AISec ’18: 11th ACM Workshop on Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Security Oct. 19, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada. ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 12 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3270101.3270111
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has evolved in many areas. These deep neural net-
works show promising results in tasks such as malware detection
[37], autonomous driving [7], network intrusion detection [34],
diagnosis in medical images[12], and in applications such as image
classification, deep neural networks can even surpass human level
performance. [10] Deep reinforcement learning has also demon-
strated promising results in recent years in many decision making
problems, such as human level control in Atari video games [23],
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defeating the best human players in the game of Go [31], making a
humanoid robot run [30], and resource management in a cluster
with different resource types [21].
Despite their success in a wide range of applications, deep neu-
ral networks, like other traditional classifiers, suffer from a vul-
nerability to adversarial examples. When working with images,
an adversarial example is an image which is carefully modified to
make a classifier predict it incorrectly with minimal modifications
to the image. In many cases, the perturbation that is added to these
images is imperceptible to a human observer. Therefore, a human is
likely to classify the images as they did before the alterations. This
problem is not limited to modifications to digital images. Kurakin
et al. in [15] showed for the first time that this attack is applicable
in the physical world as well. Later, Eykholt et al. in [8] showed
that an adversary can place a few stickers on a stop sign to fool a
classifier, e.g., causing it to predict the sign as a speed limit sign.
Due to the threat that adversarial examples pose, many researchers
have proposed solutions to address this vulnerability. These works
fall into two main categorizations. In one line of work, researchers
introduced different mechanisms to make classifiers more robust
to adversarial examples such that the models classify adversarial
inputs that are visually close to legitimate inputs correctly [4, 36].
We refer to these defenses as “fortifying defenses”. In the other
line of work, others have tried to distinguish between legitimate
examples and adversarial examples using some detection mecha-
nisms [19, 29]. We refer to these defenses as “detecting defenses”.
One method an attacker can use to craft an adversarial example
is to calculate the gradients of a loss function with respect to the
input. Carlini et al. in [5] showed that an adversary can bypass ten
detection methods by changing this loss function. Since that time,
both the detecting defenses and fortifying defenses have evolved.
The defenses now leverage techniques that prevent the adversary
from getting a useful gradient from the model or the detector even
when the loss function is changed. These techniques are called gra-
dient masking as introduced by Papernot et al. in [26]. Athalye et
al. in [1], however, demonstrated these defenses are still vulnerable
by showing a white-box approach to craft adversarial examples
against these defenses, where the attacker needs to know about the
defenses, their parameters, and model parameters.
In this paper, we introduce Stochastic Substitute training (SST),
which is an easy and general gray-box attack, for breaking de-
fenses that obfuscate gradients without any knowledge about the
model’s parameters, the defense parameters, or access to the train-
ing dataset. SST only assumes access to the logits (inputs of softmax
layer) and doesn’t need to be tailored to different defenses in the
case where they fortify a model. That is, for fortifying defenses, SST
is completely generic. For detecting defenses, the attacker should
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bring the detection conditions into the loop of crafting adversarial
examples. We do this by training a substitute model with stochas-
tically modified inputs. These inputs are the set of images that an
adversary wants to craft adversarial examples for. We evaluate two
fortifying defenses and two detecting defenses. But our approach is
not limited to these defenses and can be applied to others as well.
We make the following contributions:
• We introduce Stochastic Substitute Training (SST) to craft
adversarial examples for models that obfuscate gradients, as
old methods, such as those introduced in [6, 9, 27, 33], are
ineffective in crafting adversarial examples for models that
obfuscate gradients.
• We evaluate two fortifying defenses, random feature nulli-
fication (RFN) [36] and thermometer encoding [4], on the
MNIST [16] and CIFAR-10 [14] datasets respectively. With
SST, we show that an adversary can craft adversarial ex-
amples for models fortified with these defenses with no
knowledge about the defense and with a small amount of
perturbation.
• We evaluate two detecting defenses, SafetyNet [19] and
Defense-GAN [29], on the MNIST dataset. We show how an
adversary can bypass these detection methods.
• We compare against two black-box attacks [18, 26] that can
be used to evaluate defenses which obfuscate gradients with-
out knowledge about the defense. We show that evaluating
with these black-box approaches provides the defenses have
a false sense of security. Since, with the minimal extra visi-
bility (the logits) in our gray-box approach, we are capable
of crafting adversarial examples that the black-box attacks
cannot.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we
provide the reader with background information. Then, in Section
3, we introduce SST, our new approach for crafting adversarial
examples for defenses which obfuscate gradients. In Section 4, we
evaluate our approach against fortifying defenses, and in section 5,
we evaluate our approach against detecting defenses. In Section 6,
we compare against two black-box attacks against the aforemen-
tioned defenses, and finally in Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we first briefly explain how deep neural networks
work for image classification and then introduce the notation we
use in this paper. Finally, we go over how an adversary can craft
an adversarial example.
2.1 Deep Neural Networks
A deep neural network (as a classifier), as illustrated in Figure 1, is
a non-linear function which maps an input to a probability vector
where each of its elements corresponds to a class score. The element
that has the largest score is considered as the prediction. A deep
neural network consists of multiple layers that are connected to
each other sequentially such that the output of one layer becomes
the input of the next layer, and each layer applies a non-linear
transformation to its inputs. Each layer has a set of parameters
which are initialized randomly. By varying those parameters, the
output of the classifier changes. The goal is to find values for the
Figure 1: Illustration of a DNN classifier.
parameters such that for most of the inputs, the neural network
predicts their labels correctly, which means that the probability
corresponding to their true label should be larger than others.
In order to train this network, we want to find the set of parame-
ters that make it predict most of the inputs correctly. So, we have to
maximize the score corresponding to the true label for each input.
In general, we can say that we need to find a θ that maximizes∑K
j=0 yjFj for every input. Note that y is a vector and only one
of its elements is 1 and the others are 0. Instead of maximizing∑K
j=0 yjFj , we can minimize −
∑K
j=0 yj loд(Fj ). Mathematically, we
need to solve the following optimization problem to train a model:
arдminθ
©­«− 1N
N∑
i=0
K∑
j=0
yi j loд(Fj (xi ))ª®¬
where N is the total number of samples in our training set and K
is the total number of classes. This is called a cross-entropy loss
function, which is a function of θ . A lower value of this function
means better predictions over the training set. In order to solve this
minimization problem, a technique called gradient descent, or one
of its variants such as Adam optimization [13], is used.
2.2 Notation
In the rest of this paper we use the following notation:
• x : the legitimate (clean) input. x ∈ [0, 1]m , where m is the
number of pixels in an image.
• y: the label corresponding to the legitimate input.
• x ′: the adversarial input. x ′ ∈ [0, 1]m .
• y′: the label corresponding to the adversarial input, which
is different from its original label.
• ytarдet : the label which an adversary wants to make the
classifier output.
• F (.): the classifier which maps an image to a label. For cor-
rectly predicted inputs we have F (x) = y.
• θ : the parameters of classifier.
• Z (.): the logits, which are inputs of the softmax layer. So,
so f tmax(Z (x)) = F (x).
• δ : the perturbation which is added to a legitimate example
to make it adversarial. So, x ′ = x + δ .
2.3 Adversarial Example
Previous works showed how to craft adversarial examples in white-
box and black-box settings [2, 6, 9, 18, 24, 26, 27, 33]. We discuss
some of them here.
2.3.1 White-box Setting. Early efforts by Szegedy et al. in [33] and
Biggio et al. in [3] showed how to craft an adversarial example. The
process for crafting a targeted adversarial example can be reduced
to a box-constrained optimization problem as follows:
arдminδ | |δ | |p s.t. (x + δ ) ∈ [0, 1]m and F (x + δ ) = ytarдet
This optimization problem means that an attacker wants to find
the minimum perturbation, so that if she adds it to the input, the
classifier would predict it as the attacker’s desired target. How-
ever, neural networks are not convex, so this optimization problem
is intractable and people use different heuristics to find a small
enough perturbation that can fool the model. There is another class
of attacks, which are known as non-targeted attacks, in which the
attacker’s goal is to make the classifier misclassify the input to any
other label (as opposed to targeted attacks which the goal is to
make the classifier output a specific label). For non-targeted attacks
the optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
arдminδ | |δ | |p s.t. (x + δ ) ∈ [0, 1]m and F (x + δ ) , y
Carlini et al. in [6] described a way to craft adversarial examples,
and we explain it here briefly as we use the same loss function in
our attack. They designed their attack by introducing a new objec-
tive function. The objective function that they used is as follows:
minimize c .| |δ | |p + f (x + δ ) s.t. x + δ ∈ [0, 1]m
in which p can be 0,2 or∞. One of their choices for function f is:
f (x ′) = (maxi,t (Z (x ′)i ) − Z (x ′)t )+
in which Z is the logit which are the inputs to the softmax func-
tion, t is the target label, (e)+ is short-hand formax(e, 0), and c is a
hyper parameter that determines the trade-off between the amount
of distortion and the growth of the target score. By decreasing c ,
the amount of distortion and the success probability grows. They
showed that by using this function, they can craft adversarial ex-
amples for the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet datasets with less
distortion compared to other white-box attacks. This minimization
basically says that we want to find a δ such that its magnitude is
minimal (with respect to l0, l2 or l∞ norm) and the logit value
corresponding to the target label is larger than other logits, which
makes the classifier predict the input as the target class. This opti-
mization problem is solved by the help of gradient descent, which
we mentioned earlier. Carlini and Wagner also showed that they
can build adversarial examples that will make the classifier output
the target label with higher probability by slightly changing the
function f as follows:
f (x ′) =max(maxi,t (Z (x ′)i ) − Z (x ′)t ,−κ)
in whichκ >= 0 and determines the confidence score. By increasing
κ, the confidence score of the target class becomes larger. This
function basically means that we keep modifying the input as long
as Z (x ′)t < maxi,t (Z (x ′)i ) + κ.
This technique is not the only way to craft adversarial examples.
For more information about crafting adversarial examples in white-
box setting we refer the reader to [2, 9, 24, 27, 33].
2.3.2 Black-box setting. Szegedy et al. in [33] also showed that,
in many cases, an adversarial example built using one classifier
can fool another classifier that has a different architecture and pa-
rameters. This property is called the transferability of adversarial
examples. By using this property, Carlini et al. in [6] showed that
they could craft adversarial examples against classifiers fortified
by defensive distillation [28], which block gradients by crafting ad-
versarial examples against a different model with high confidence.
Later, Liu et al. in [18] built on top of this idea and crafted adver-
sarial examples against multiple pre-trained models to then be able
to transfer them to the target model. It has been also shown by
Tramèr et al. in [35] that augmenting training data with adversarial
examples generated by a few fixed, pre-trained models significantly
improves the robustness of a model in the face of these types of
transferable black-box attacks.
Biggio et al. in [3] and Papernot et al. in [26] showed that an
adversary can craft adversarial examples against a model in a black-
box setting by querying the target model and training a substitute
model using the labels predicted by the target model. In this case, af-
ter training the substitute model, the adversary can craft adversarial
examples against the substitute model in order to transfer them to
the target model. Papernot et al. in [26] also showed independently
that they can evade defensive distillation by querying the target
model in a black-box setting.
Our work is built on top of this transferability property and sub-
stitute training approach and provides a better tool for evaluating
defenses by considering a more powerful attacker that has access
to the logits of the target model.
2.4 Defenses
In general, there are two different approaches for defending against
adversarial examples:
• Fortifying Defenses: These types of defenses try to make
the classifier predict adversarial examples as their correct
class. Techniques that are used include removing adversarial
perturbation by transforming the input before feeding it to
the classifier, quantization or discretization of the input, and
randomization of the input or the model.
• Detecting Defenses: For these types of defenses, the classifier
may predict an adversarial example incorrectly, but there is
an adversarial detection mechanism that makes the whole
model reject those cases. A technique used for these defenses
is to augment the classifier with another DNN (or any other
model) to classify the input as legitimate or adversarial, or
other means of detection such as using some statistics which
are assumed to be co-related with adversarial examples.
3 STOCHASTIC SUBSTITUTE TRAINING
In this section, we introduce our new gray-box approach to gener-
ating adversarial examples.
3.1 Threat Model
Before describing our approach, it is useful to clarify the threat
model. In this paper we consider two different threat models:
Figure 2: Illustration of Stochastic Substitute Training.
• For evaluating fortifying defenses, we consider an attacker
that can send inputs to the model and see the logits. The
attacker is not aware that a defense is in place and she doesn’t
have access to the model or defense parameters.
• For evaluating the defenses that detect adversarial examples,
we consider an attacker that knows a detection mechanism
is in place. She can send inputs to the model and see logits
and the output of the detector but doesn’t have access to the
model or detector parameters.
3.2 Algorithm
In order to attack the robust classifiers with defenses that obfus-
cate gradients, we use the transferability property of adversarial
examples. In general, we add different levels of random noise to
the set of images we want to craft adversarial examples for. In the
case of our experiments, this would be the test set of MNIST and
CIFAR-10. We then feed this dataset to the robust classifier and
record the logits. After that, we train a substitute model with this
dataset and the recorded logits. Figure 2 illustrates this process.
For training this model, instead of using a default cross entropy
loss, we use the mean square error between the substitute model’s
logits and logits we got from the robust model as our loss function.
More specifically, the loss function is defined as follows:
LossSST =
1
N
N∑
i=0
K∑
j=0
1
K
(
Z robustj (xi + ri ) − Z subj (xi + ri )
)2
where ri is the noise added to the sample xi and N is the total
number of inputs in our augmented dataset. Training a substitute
model in this way makes the substitute model’s decision bound-
aries for that dataset very close to the robust model, which makes
transferability to the robust model easier. Further, since the sub-
stitute model is differentiable, we can craft adversarial examples
for it using an iterative method. Training a substitute model with
images augmented with random noise helps the substitute learn
how the robust model’s class probabilities change in the neighbor-
hood of each sample. Note that these types of random noises do not
necessarily change the prediction of the robust model, but it helps
the substitute detect in which directions the correct class score can
be decreased. Also, because we assumed that the attacker doesn’t
know the defense which is in place and how robust the model is,
we augment the dataset with different levels of random noise. This
is because if we add a low level of random noise, the model might
be very robust and the adversarial perturbations found during the
crafting procedure may not be sufficient to fool the classifier. On
the other hand, if we add a high level of random noise, the model
may not be that robust and unnecessary adversarial perturbations
would be added to the images during crafting procedure. The reason
we use logits instead of class probabilities is that the effect of low
level random noise is more obvious in logits compared to proba-
bilities. Using probabilities may not capture the impact of small
amount of random noise because of the floating point precision.
We empirically found that for complex datasets, training multiple
copies of a model with different random noises reduces the required
adversarial perturbation on average. We speculate this is because
the decision boundaries of the robust model and substitute models
are not completely matched, and each of the substitute models ap-
proximates the decision boundaries for some specific images better
than others.
After training the substitute model for multiple epochs, we craft
adversarial examples against it by using the C&W loss function
mentioned in Section 2.3 and gradient descent to minimize this
loss function iteratively. By doing so, we find a small adversarial
perturbation that fools the robust model. We minimize the loss
function by using the Adam algorithm as our optimizer. In each
iteration, we check if the current perturbation can fool the robust
model. If so, we increase the c parameter in the C&W loss function
to craft adversarial examples with a smaller amount of distortion
in subsequent iterations. We also keep decreasing the value of c in
each iteration until we fool the robust model in order to increase
the amount of perturbation and chance of transferability. If we
couldn’t find an adversarial example in the first run, we restart the
algorithm and increase κ to build adversarial examples with higher
confidence. This might increase the amount of perturbation, but
it also increases the chance of transferability to the robust model.
Algorithm 1 shows this process for crafting adversarial examples.
In this procedure F is the target classifier.
3.3 Benefit of Noisy Data Augmentation
In order to show the benefit of our stochastic substitute training
over an approach that uses a substitute model trained without data
augmentation, we first trained a model on MNIST as our target
model. Then, we trained a substitute model with and without aug-
menting data with random noises with the first 100 samples from
MNIST test set. We made 2100 replication of this set and trained
the substitute model on this dataset one epoch with lr=0.001 and
another epoch with lr=0.0001. Different levels of random noises
were added to different replicas for the one used in SST. Then with
each of the substitute models, we crafted an adversarial example
with Algorithm 1 for the first 100 samples. The average l2 norm
of adversarial examples crafted with stochastic substitute training
was 1.57. The average l2 norm for the substitute model which was
trained without data augmentation was 3.10. As it can be seen, the
average perturbation of images crafted without SST is almost 2
times larger than those which are crafted with SST.
For the sake of comparison, to measure what we are sacrificing
by limiting our approach to a gray-box setting, we also crafted
adversarial examples with the C&W attack for the target model in
a white-box setting. The average l2 norm of adversarial examples
crafted in this way was 1.25, which can be seen as the minimum
required perturbation found by current white box techniques to
fool the target model for those images. As it can be seen, crafted
adversarial examples with C&W are only slightly better than those
crafted with SST.
Algorithm 1 Crating adversarial examples
1: procedure CraftAdvExample(x , totalRun, totalIter , F )
2: adv ← [0]m #Adversarial Example
3: for each i ∈ [0, totalRun] do
4: initialize δ randomly
5: for each j ∈ [0, totalIter ] do
6: take one step of GD using Adam
7: x ′ ← Clip(x + δ )
8: if adv == [0]m then
9: decrease c
10: end if
11: # Check detector’s prediction as well (if any)
12: if F (x ′) , y and | |x − x ′ | |2 < | |x − adv | |2 then
13: adv ← x ′
14: increase c
15: end if
16: end for
17: increase κ
18: end for
19: end procedure
4 EVALUATION OF SST AGAINST
FORTIFYING DEFENSES
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of SST against two
fortifying defenses – random feature nullification (RFN) [36] and
thermometer encoding [4].
4.1 Random Feature Nullification
Wang et al. in [36] proposed an adversary resistant technique to
obstruct attackers from constructing impactful adversarial samples.
They called this adversarial resistant technique “random feature
nullification” and is described as follows:
For each batch of inputs denoted by X ∈ Rn×m , where n is the
number of samples andm is the feature vector size, random feature
nullification performs element-wise multiplication of X with a ran-
domly generated mask matrix Ip ∈ Rn×m , where its elements are
only 1 or 0. The result is then fed to the classifier. During training
they generate a mask matrix in a way to randomly select the num-
ber of features to nullify and also randomly select which features
to nullify. More specifically, for each row of Ip denoted by Ipi , the
number of features to be nullified are selected from the Gaussian
distribution N (µp ,σ 2p ), and then a uniform distribution is used for
generating each row of Ip . During test-time, the nullification rate
is fixed to µp , but choosing features in each sample is still random
with uniform distribution. The randomness they introduced dur-
ing test-time prevents an adversary from computing the gradients
needed for crafting an adversarial example. In their evaluation they
showed that a classifier fortified by RFN can resist against 71.44%
of generated adversarial examples in the case where the adversary
is allowed to change the value of each pixel by 0.25.
4.1.1 Our Evaluation. Since the authors didn’t publish their code,
in order to evaluate RFN, we trained a model with the same archi-
tecture and parameters they used in their paper. More specifically,
the parameters can be found in Table 5 in the Appendix. For the
hyper parameters of RFN, we set µp to 0.5 and σ to 0.05. During test
time for each input, half of its features are nullified before feeding
to the DNN. After training the model, we got 96.63% accuracy on
the MNIST test set.
For training the substitute model, we added uniform random
noise to the test set and created a new data set with 70000 samples.
For the first 10000 samples the range of noises was in [−0.05, 0.05],
for the next 10000 samples it was in [−0.1, 0.1], and so on. We used
Adam optimizer to train the substitute model with 0.001 learning
rate for 10 epochs and then 5 epochs with 0.0001 learning rate. It
finally reached 97.91% accuracy on legitimate test samples. The
substitute model architecture can be found in Table 6 in the Appen-
dix. In this table, the convolution layer parameters are described as
M,K×K , S which refers to a convolution layer with M feature maps,
filter size K × K and stride S. The Max Pooling layer parameters
are described as K ×K , S , which refers to a Max Pooling layer with
pool size K × K and stride S.
Since RFN is a stochastic defense, feeding the same image to the
model multiple times may cause different results. So, an adversarial
example may fool the classifier in one run, but it may be predicted
correctly in the next run. In the paper, it is not discussed what
exactly should be considered as fooling the model. Here we report
the accuracy of the model on legitimate samples and the average
l2 norm that is required to fool this model in different scenarios.
First, we consider an input to be classified correctly if in 100 parallel
runs the model can predict it correctly for more than 50 cases. In
the second scenario, we change this threshold to 70, and for the
last one we change it to 90. For the evaluation of the model, we
used the first 100 samples in the test set to generate adversarial
examples using our attack. For crafting adversarial examples, we set
the learning rate to 0.001. For each sample, we chose the target label
as the second most probable class predicted by the robust model. In
Algorithm 1, we set the total run to 3 and total iterations to 300. First,
we evaluated this model with an l2 attack. The average l2 norm
for different scenarios can be found in Table 1. The success rate
in all cases was 100%. Figure 3 also shows the crafted adversarial
examples against this model when the threshold is 50.
For this defense we also generated adversarial examples with
l∞ = 0.25. We could generate adversarial examples for 94 samples
out of 100 in the first scenario. So, in this case, the resistance rate
is only 6%. In the second scenario, we could generate adversarial
examples for 92 samples. For the last scenario, we could generate
adversarial examples for 75 samples.
4.2 Thermometer Encoding
Buckman et al. in [4] introduced another defense, called thermome-
ter encoding, which makes a model more robust against adversarial
examples. It prevents an adversary from calculating the gradients
that are needed for crafting adversarial examples. Thermometer
Threshold Accuracy L2 norm
50 97.93 2.13
70 96.46 2.43
90 92.78 2.96
Table 1: The accuracy of a model fortified with RFN and the
average l2 norm of the required perturbation across differ-
ent thresholds.
Figure 3: Adversarial examples crafted for the MNIST
dataset against a classifier fortified with RFN. They are mis-
classified for more than 50 times in 100 parallel runs.
encoding is applied to each pixel of the input before feeding it to
the classifier to discretize it. The way it works is as follows: for
each pixel p of the image the k-level thermometer-encoding τ (p) is
a k-dimensional vector where
τ (p)j =
{
1, if p ≥ j/k
0, otherwise
and τ (p)j is the j-th element of the vector. For example, for a
10-level thermometer encoding, τ (0.33) = 1110000000. Since this
function does a discrete transformation, it is not possible to back-
propagate gradients through it. Therefore, an adversary can’t craft
adversarial examples for it using traditional white-box techniques.
4.2.1 Our Evaluation. For evaluating the effectiveness of SST against
this defense, we used the model trained by Athalye et al. in [1],
which is a wide ResNet model [38] fortified by thermometer encod-
ing trained on CIFAR-10. For training this model, the adversarial
training technique introduced by Madry et al. in [20] is also used
for more robustness.
For attacking this model, we trained multiple substitute models
with different levels of random noise. The model architecture we
used as our substitute model is described in Table 7 in the Appendix.
We trained four copies of this model on the CIFAR-10 test set, which
we refer to as A, B, C and D. More specifically, we created a new
dataset by replicating the CIFAR-10 test set eight times and adding
different levels of random noises to it. We trained each substitute
model with the training procedure we described in Section 3. The
range of noises we added for training model A was [− 2255 ×i, 2255 ×i]
for i ∈ [1, 8], where i was incremented for each replica. This range
for Model B, C and D was [− 3255 × i, 3255 × i], [− 4255 × i, 4255 × i], and
[− 5255 × i, 5255 × i] respectively. Each of the substitute models was
trained by the Adam optimizer as follows: 6 epochs with lr=0.001,
3 epochs with lr=0.0005, 3 epochs with lr=0.0001, 3 epochs with
lr=0.00005, 3 epochs with lr=0.00001, 3 epochs with lr=0.000005,
and 3 epochs with lr=0.000001.
Substitute
Model(s)
Success
Rate L2 Norm Time
A,B,C,D 100% 2.79 69 sec
A,B 99% 3.14 58 sec
C,D 99% 2.96 56 sec
A 96% 3.46 51 sec
B 99% 3.52 51 sec
C 97% 3.45 51 sec
D 99% 3.54 51 sec
Table 2: Results of applying our attack against thermometer
encoding.
Figure 4: Adversarial examples crafted for the CIFAR-10
dataset against a classifier fortified with thermometer en-
coding using 4 substitute models.
We finally crafted adversarial examples using these models. For
the first 100 images in the CIFAR-10 test set that were predicted
correctly by the robust model, we set the total run to 3 and total
iterations to 600. After every 100 iterations, we restarted the pertur-
bation randomly to reduce the impact of sticking in a local minimum.
Table 2 shows the success rate and average l2 norm for different
scenarios in addition to average time for crafting one adversarial
example. Figure 4 shows the adversarial examples generated using
all 4 models. The reason that we couldn’t find an adversarial exam-
ple in some cases is that our substitute models didn’t approximate
the decision boundaries of the target model well enough in those
cases. After some iterations, because of the values we chose for κ,
Z sub (x ′)t becomes greater thanmaxi,t (Z sub (x ′)i )+κ. As a result,
the loss function becomes a constant value, with a gradient 0. Thus,
newer perturbations won’t be added to the current perturbation
and the attack doesn’t progress. We speculate that this problem can
be solved by choosing a higher value for κ for those cases where
the attack fails. The cost is a higher level of perturbation.
5 EVALUATION OF SST AGAINST DETECTING
DEFENSES
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of SST against the
SafetyNet [19] and Defense-GAN [29] detecting defenses.
5.1 SafetyNet
Metzen et al. in [22] introduced a way to detect adversarial exam-
ples by augmenting the classifier with another DNN which acts
as a detector. This detector network is trained with the outputs of
some intermediate layer of the original classifier while adversarial
examples and legitimate examples are fed into it. Later, Carlini et
al. in [5] showed that an adversary can craft adversarial examples
against this defense by changing the loss function such that an
adversarial example can be crafted by back-propagating through
both the original classifier and detector.
But, Lu et al. in [19] introduced another mechanism for adding
a detector called SafetyNet. In SafetyNet, the detector is still con-
nected to the output of some late layer of the classifier. But they
used two techniques which make it impossible for the adversary to
get any gradient from the detector. The first technique is quanti-
zation, in which the outputs of ReLU is quantized at some specific
thresholds. The other technique is using a support vector machine
(SVM) with a radial basis function (RBF) kernel as the detector. This
provides no useful gradient to the adversary. They also observed
that “there is a trade-off between classification confidence and de-
tection easiness for adversarial examples. Adversarial examples
with high confidence in wrong classification labels tend to have
more abnormal activation patterns, so they are easier to be detected
by detectors.” As a result, the classification confidence is also con-
sidered in SafetyNet. For each input, the ratio of the second highest
classification confidence to the highest classification confidence is
calculated, and if it is bigger than a specific threshold that example
is rejected. For our experiments, we set this threshold to 0.25, as
suggested in the original paper.
5.1.1 Our Evaluation. Since the code for SafetyNet was not pub-
lished, we implemented their defense ourselves on a model trained
on MNIST. The model architecture we used for training is described
in Table 8 in the Appendix. We trained this model with the Adam
optimizer: 3 epochs with lr=0.001 and 3 epochs with lr=0.0001. The
accuracy of this model on the MNIST test set was 99.15%, and the
average confidence of correctly classified images was 99.63%.
To train the detector, we first generated non-targeted adversarial
examples for the first 5000 samples of the training set using the
C&W attack. For training the detector, we used the outputs of the
first fully connected layer (layer 4), and we quantized them into
four bins before feeding them to the SVM with the RBF kernel.
Since the SafetyNet paper does not describe how the thresholds
for quantization should be chosen, we chose them as follows: We
fed our training data to the classifier and collected the outputs of
layer 4. We sorted all the positive values from this data and found
the 1st quartile Q1, median, and 3rd quartile Q3 and used them as
thresholds for quantization. So all of the 0s, and any value less than
the 1st quartile, were converted to the middle of that bin (i.e. (Q1−0)2 ).
Any value between the 1st quartile andmedian was converted to the
middle of the second bin (i.e.,Q1+median−Q12 ), and so on. Note that
our attack works regardless of the way quantization thresholds are
chosen. We decided to choose thresholds in this way as it gave us a
good accuracy for training the detector. After training the detector
in this way, it could achieve 95.15% accuracy on the MNIST test set.
In order to attack this defense, we trained two models with the
logits of the classifier in the same way we did for RFN. We also
trained another model with probability scores of the detector while
the same data set was fed into the classifier. The architecture of the
substitute classifier was same as the one we used for attacking RFN.
The architecture of the substitute detector can be found in Table 9
in the Appendix. Note that we assumed that the attacker doesn’t
know where the detector is connected or what the input to it is. So,
the substitute detector is trained on raw pixel values.
With the procedure we introduced in Algorithm 1, we crafted
adversarial examples against SafetyNet. We set the total run value
to 3 and total iterations to 300. The only difference was that in the
Figure 5: Adversarial examples crafted against SafetyNet for
the MNIST dataset.
inner loop we checked three things to make sure that the defense
is bypassed. First, we checked to make sure that the adversarial
example fools the classifier. Second, we checked that the confidence
ratio is less than 0.25, and finally we checked to make sure the
detector predicts it as a legitimate sample. We crafted adversarial
examples for the first 100 samples that are classified correctly and
predicted as legitimate samples by the detector. The average l2
norm of crafted adversarial examples was 3.37, and the success rate
was 98%. You can see a few samples in Figure 5. In this figure the ad-
versarial examples are in the first and third rows and corresponding
legitimate examples are in the second and forth rows.
5.2 Defense-GAN
Samangouei et al. in [29] introduced a defense that makes a classifier
more robust against adversarial examples. They also provided a
mechanism to detect adversarial examples in case an attacker could
fool the classifier. They called this defense, Defense-GAN as they
used a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) as part of their
defense. A GAN consists of a generator G and a discriminator D
in which, given a random vector z the generator tries to generate
samples from a particular distribution and the discriminator tries
to discriminate between a real sample and a generated sample
by G. After training a GAN, the generator learns to generate a
sample from that distribution. It is also shown that given an image
x from that distribution, a vector z can be found such that the
reconstruction error | |G(z)−x | |2 −→ 0. So, this vector can be found
by choosing a random vector z and then minimizing | |G(z) − x | |2
with gradient descent for L steps and updating z in each step. In
their defense, a GAN is first trained on legitimate examples.
Then at test time, given an image x and a random vector z, they
first project x into the range of the generator using L steps of GD to
minimize | |G(z)−x | |22 , and they do it R times for R different random
vector z1, z2, ...zR . Then, they choose the vector z∗ that has a smaller
reconstruction error and feed G(z∗) to the classifier. They argued
that by using this technique, a lot of adversarial perturbations
will be removed from an image before feeding it to the classifier.
Also, intuitively, given an image x after L iterations of GD, the
reconstruction error is small if x was a legitimate example and
large if it is otherwise. They used this property as their detection
mechanism. So, given a threshold θ if | |G(z∗) − x | |22 is larger than θ
it is considered as an adversarial example and otherwise legitimate.
5.2.1 Our Evaluation. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of SST
against Defense-GAN, we first trained a GAN with their published
code for 200,000 iterations. During the test time, we set L = 200
and R = 10.
The model architecture and parameters we used for the GAN’s
generator and discriminator are the same as those that were used
in [29]. For the classifier, we used the model described in Table
11 in the Appendix. After training, the accuracy of this model on
the MNIST test set was 99.26%. The accuracy on the output of the
generator was 97.13%. Since it is not specified in the paper how
θ should be chosen, we chose it in a way such that all correctly
classified legitimate images are considered legitimate. Based on
9713 samples that were classified correctly, we set θ = 0.0536,
which is the largest reconstruction error for a correctly classified
sample.
The architecture we used for the substitute model is the same as
the one we used for attacking RFN. The dataset we used for training
the substitute model was 7 replications of the MNIST test set, where
a specific amount of random noise was added for each replication.
The range of random noise we added was [−0.15 × i, 0.15 × i] for
i ∈ [1, 7],where i was incremented for each replica. We trained four
substitute models with this dataset. Crafting adversarial examples
with this approach is very slow because querying Defense-GAN
takes a long time. This makes training substitute models very slow,
and in the process of crafting adversarial examples, we have to
query Defense-GAN again in each iteration. We decided to craft
adversarial exampleswith this approach for 15 samples. The average
time was 156 seconds and success rate was 80%, and the average
l2 norm of successful adversarial examples was 4.00. We speculate
that our attack is less successful against this defense because of
the generator. The generator removes a lot of random noise from
our augmented dataset before feeding it to the classifier. In other
words, it maps several distant inputs in our dataset to very close
points before feeding them to the classifier. This behavior results in
a smaller amount of variation in logits and makes SST less effective.
One way to reduce this impact is to query the target model for a
larger dataset, but this would result in a process that is very slow.
In our second attack, we trained a substitute model on theMNIST
test set plus random noise with a range [−0.95, 0.95] for 20 epochs,
and in each epoch we updated the random noise. We didn’t query
Defense-GAN for training this model and used the default class
labels and cross entropy loss for training. In order to make the
crafting process faster in each iteration, we first checked whether
the current adversarial example can fool a model augmented by
Defense-GAN with L = 30 and R = 1. If we could fool it, we
then checked it against the model with default parameters (L =
200 and R = 10). Since Defense-GAN has stochastic behavior for
the same input in different runs, the output might be different.
Thus, it is not clear when we should consider an attack successful.
So, we considered an attack successful if the crafted adversarial
example could fool the Defense-GAN in three consecutive runs.
The sample adversarial examples crafted against this defense can
be found in Figure 6. The samples are the result of running the
attack while setting the target class to the second, third, and forth
most probable classes, scored by the original model and choosing
the least perturbed one. The success rate for the first 100 samples in
the test set, which were classified correctly by the robust classifier,
was 100%, and the average l2 norm of perturbations was 3.23. The
maximum reconstruction error was 0.0431, which is less than θ .
Figure 6: Adversarial examples crafted against Defense-
GAN for the MNIST dataset.
Therefore, all of the crafted adversarial examples are considered as
legitimate examples by the detector. The average reconstruction
error was 0.0157. Note that this attack is even more powerful than
the first approach, as the attacker doesn’t know anything about the
attack, the detection mechanism, or the classifier’s parameters.
6 DISCUSSION OF RELATEDWORKS
In this section, we evaluate the aforementioned defenses with two
types of black-box attacks (mentioned in Section 2.3) that can also
be used to craft adversarial examples with no knowledge about a
defense and no need to be tailored towards different defenses. While
black-box attacks might be more practical than the gray-box setting
we considered, as our experiments in this section show, they are not
good for evaluating new defenses, such as those we considered in
this paper, as in many cases they can’t find an adversarial example
or the required perturbation is so high that it makes it hard even
for a human to label correctly.
6.1 Black-Box Attack with Jacobian based
Dataset Augmentation
Papernot et al. in [26] introduced a black-box attack that many
researchers have used to show the robustness of their defense
in a black-box setting. Similar to our attack, the authors in [26]
showed how to attack a model using a small synthetic dataset
without having access to the DNN’s parameters or knowing about
the defense that is in place. Their attack was of the non-targeted
attack type in that they only made the model to mis-classify the
inputs. The threat model they considered was different from what
we considered in this paper. They assumed that an attacker only
can send input to the target model and observe its predicted class,
where we assume the the attacker also has access to the logits.
To attack the target model, they trained a substitute model to
approximate the target model decision boundaries through a proce-
dure called Jacobian-based Dataset Augmentation. Theway it works
is as follows: First they collect an initial small dataset. Then, they
label this dataset using an Oracle (black box) model. Next, they train
a substitute model using this dataset. Then, for each input x in their
dataset, they evaluate the sign of the Jacobian matrix dimension cor-
responding to the label assigned to x by the oracle: sдn(JF (x)[O(x)]),
where F is the substitute model andO(x) is the label assigned to the
input by oracle. They then augment their initial dataset with new
points created as follows: xnew = x + λ.sдn(JF (x)[O(x)]), where
λ is a hyper parameter. Finally, they repeat these steps for a few
iterations (substitute training epochs) so the substitute model can
approximate the oracle decision boundaries.
After training a substitute model, the attacker crafts adversarial
examples for the substitute model with the help of the JSMA and
FGSM approaches in order to transfer them to the black-box model.
We implemented this attack against the four defenses we considered,
and the results can be found in Table 3. In all the cases, we crafted
adversarial examples with the FGSM attack for the substitute model
and checked what percentage of them can fool the robust model.
For evaluating all defenses, we trained the substitute model for
6 substitute training epochs using CleverHans library [25] and set
the initial dataset to be the first 150 samples in the MNIST test
set for RFN, SafetyNet, and Defense-GAN and first 150 samples
in the CIFAR-10 test set for thermometer encoding. We also set
λ = 0.1. The success rate for the adversarial examples crafted
against detecting defenses (Defense-GAN and SafetyNet) shows
the ones that could fool the classifier and are not detected by the
detector. For example, for Defense-GAN, when ϵ = 0.5, 92 out of
100 samples could fool the classifier, but all of them were detected
as adversarial examples by the detector. The substitute model we
used for attacking Defense-GAN was Model 1 described in Table 11
in the Appendix. The substitute model used for attacking SafetyNet
was the same as the one we used in our attack. We evaluated RFN by
setting ϵ = 0.25. This is the same value we used for evaluating our
attack against RFN in 3 different scenarios, which are referred to as
RFN-50, RFN-70 and RFN-90. For example, for RFN-50, 47 samples
could fool the classifier more than 50 times in 100 parallel runs.
For evaluating this attack against thermometer encoding, we used
the same model as the one we used in our attack for the substitute
model. Figure 7 shows the generated adversarial examples against
this defense at different value of ϵ . The rows are for ϵ = 8255 ,
ϵ = 16255 , ϵ =
24
255 , ϵ =
32
255 , and ϵ =
64
255 respectively. As can be
seen, it becomes hard even for human eyes to classify these images
correctly after ϵ = 32255 . Note that for RFN with the same level of
distortion, the success rate of our approach is 2 times, 2.78 times
and 3.4 times better than this black-box attack for RFN-50, RFN-
70 and RFN-90 respectively. For thermometer encoding, with our
approach the adversary could reach 100% success rate, but when
using this black-box attack, even when ϵ = 64255 and the images
are unrecognizable by human eyes, the adversary could only reach
69% success rate. For detecting defenses, our approach also shows
superiority and its success rate is at least 10 times better than this
attack.
6.2 Transferable Adversarial Examples
Liu et al. in [18] designed a different targeted black box attack. In
contrast to our attack, they considered a different threat model
where they don’t need to query the target model to get the outputs
for different inputs, and they don’t need to train a substitute model.
Instead of training a substitute model, they leverage an ensemble
of pre-trained models to craft adversarial examples that can be
transferred to another model with their targeted labels.
The authors showed that by generating adversarial examples
for an ensemble of pre-trained neural networks, it is more likely
to transfer them to another classifier. Formally, given k white-box
Defense Type Success Rate L2 norm eps
RFN-50 47% 5.15 0.25
RFN-70 33% 5.12 0.25
RFN-90 20% 5.11 0.25
Thermometer 1% 1.73 8255
Thermometer 7% 3.40 16255
Thermometer 14% 5.12 24255
Thermometer 32% 6.83 32255
Thermometer 69% 13.12 64255
SafetyNet 0% NA 0.2
SafetyNet 0% NA 0.3
SafetyNet 0% NA 0.4
SafetyNet 0% NA 0.5
Defense-GAN 7% 6.25 0.3
Defense-GAN 0% NA 0.5
Table 3: Success rate of Jacobian-based Data Augmenta-
tion attack against different defenses. RFN, SafetyNet, and
Defense-GAN were evaluated on MNIST. Thermometer en-
coding was evaluated on CIFAR-10.
Figure 7: Adversarial examples crafted for CIFAR-10 to fool
a classifier fortified with thermometer encoding at different
levels of perturbation.
models with softmax outputs being F1, ..., Fk , they solve the follow-
ing optimization problem:
arдminδ − log((
∑k
i=1 αiFi (x ′)).1ytarдet ) + λd(x ,x ′)
where
∑k
i=1 αiFi (x∗) is the ensemble model, αi are the ensemble
weights, and
∑k
i=1 αi = 1. d(x ,x ′) is the distance function between
the original image and the perturbed image which can be l2 norm.
λ is a hyper parameter which controls the amount of distortion and
the success rate. Increasing λ results in a larger distortion, while
also increasing the success rate (likelihood of being able to fool the
target classifier). Solving this optimization problem basically means
that the attacker wants to maximize the score of the targeted label
in all of the classifiers while keeping the amount of distortion small.
We implemented this attack against the four defenses we con-
sidered, and the results can be found in Table 4. For attacking RFN,
SafetyNet, and DefenseGAN, we trained four substitute models
described in Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14 on the MNIST training set for
Figure 8: Adversarial examples crafted with different λ for
the MNIST dataset.
10 epochs each and with Adam optimizer (lr=0.001). The architec-
ture of these models can be found in the Appendix. For generating
adversarial examples, as in the original paper, we used Adam with
lr=0.001 to optimize the above objective and αi = 0.25. For gener-
ating each adversarial example, we did 300 iterations of GD. For
SafetyNet, we crafted adversarial examples by changing the λ pa-
rameters. As you can see in Table 4, when λ = 0.001 the success
rate is only 17%. However, even in this case, the amount of pertur-
bation is too high. Samples of adversarial examples generated by
this method can be found in Figure 8. For the first row λ is 0.1, for
the second one λ is 0.01, and for the last one λ is 0.001.
For applying this attack on thermometer encoding, since our
robust model was trained on CIFAR-10, we trained four other mod-
els to generate adversarial examples with them, and we trained all
of them with the CIFAR-10 training set. The models we trained
for this purpose were VGG-19 [32], wide ResNet [38], ResNet-50
[11] and NIN [17]. After training the VGG model reached to 93.41%
accuracy, the wide ResNet model reached to 92% accuracy, the NIN
model reached 90.29% accuracy, and the ResNet-50 reached 94.06%
accuracy. We trained all of these models with 4 Tesla K80 GPUs. The
training time for these models were 2, 7, 1, and 6 hours respectively.
This is a much longer training time than in our approach, in which
we trained a smaller model, and it only took a few minutes. The
robust model’s accuracy was also 88.59%. For the attack we used
the same hyper parameters as the ones we used against three other
defenses. Generating each adversarial example took 63 seconds on
average. Samples of crafted adversarial examples, with different
λ, are shown in Figure 9. Note that for RFN, in an unbounded at-
tack, our approach could reach 100% success rate. Using this attack,
amongst our experiments, the best case success rate was 93% (For
RFN-50 when λ = 0.001). The average l2 norm of adversarial ex-
amples crafted by our approach against RFN-50 was 2.13, which
is almost 3 times smaller than the average l2 norm of crafted ad-
versarial example using this approach. For thermometer encoding,
in the best case, using this attack it could reach 39% success rate.
Using our approach, we could reach 100% success rate, and the
average l2 norm of adversarial examples found by our approach
in the best case (when we used 4 substitute models) is 2.68 times
smaller than the average l2 norm of crafted adversarial examples
found by this approach. For detecting defenses, our approach is
also more successful and at least 5 times better than this attack.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we described a way to craft adversarial examples
against deep neural network models that leverage mechanisms to
protect themselves against adversarial examples. We evaluated our
approach against fortifying and detecting defenses. We showed that
Defense Type Success Rate L2 norm λ
RFN-50 26% 1.74 0.1
RFN-70 16% 1.74 0.1
RFN-90 1% 1.59 0.1
RFN-50 84% 3.52 0.01
RFN-70 54% 3.44 0.01
RFN-90 30% 3.27 0.01
RFN-50 93% 6.31 0.001
RFN-70 88% 6.23 0.001
RFN-90 81% 6.15 0.001
Thermometer 4% 2.01 0.1
Thermometer 25% 5.11 0.01
Thermometer 39% 7.47 0.001
SafetyNet 0% NA 0.1
SafetyNet 2% 3.83 0.01
SafetyNet 17% 5.58 0.001
SafetyNet 17% 6.26 0.0001
Defense-GAN 1% 1.62 0.1
Defense-GAN 10% 2.78 0.01
Defense-GAN 18% 6.33 0.001
Table 4: The success rate and average l2 norm of crafted ad-
versarial examples by Liu et al. work against different de-
fenses. RFN, SafetyNet, andDefense-GANwere evaluated on
MNIST. Thermometer encodingwas evaluated onCIFAR-10.
Figure 9: Adversarial examples crafted with different λ for
the CIFAR-10 dataset.
an adversary can craft adversarial examples without any knowledge
about the type of defense used, defense parameters, model parame-
ters, or training data. The adversary only needs to query the robust
model and train one or more substitute models. We also evaluated
two black-box attacks against the aforementioned defenses, but
they performed poorly in comparison to our presented attack. We
suggest that other researchers use our approach for benchmarking
in cases where a defense prevents the attacker from calculating
useful gradients from the target model.
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APPENDIX
The model architectures and parameters we used throughout the
paper.
DNN Structure 784-784-784-784-10
Activation Relu
Optimizer SGD
Learning Rate 0.1
Dropout Rate 0.25
Batch Size 100
Epoch 25
Table 5: The model architecture and hyper parameters used
for training the model for RFN evaluation.
Layer Type Parameters
Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
Max Pooling 2 × 2, 2
Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
Fully Connected + ReLU 2048
Fully Connected 10
Softmax -
Table 6: The substitutemodel architecture and hyper param-
eters used for attacking RFN.
Layer Type Parameters
Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
Max Pooling 2 × 2, 2
Convolution + ReLU 128, 3 × 3, 1
Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
Max Pooling 2 × 2, 2
Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
Fully Connected + ReLU 4096
Fully Connected + ReLU 1024
Fully Connected 10
Softmax -
Table 7: The substitutemodel architecture and hyper param-
eters used for attacking Thermometer Encoding
Layer# Layer Type Parameters
1 Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
2 Max Pooling 2 × 2, 2
3 Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
4 Fully Connected + ReLU 2048
5 Fully Connected 10
6 Softmax -
Table 8: The model architecture used for evaluating Safe-
tyNet.
Layer# Layer Type Parameters
1 Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
2 Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
3 Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
4 Max Pooling 2 × 2, 2
5 Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 1
6 Fully Connected + ReLU 1024
7 Fully Connected + ReLU 512
8 Fully Connected + ReLU 512
9 Fully Connected 2
10 Softmax -
Table 9: The substitute detector architecture used for attack-
ing SafetyNet.
Layer Type Parameters
Convolution + ReLU 64, 5 × 5, 1
Convolution + ReLU 64, 5 × 5, 2
Dropout 0.25
Fully Connected + ReLU 128
Dropout 0.5
Fully Connected 10
Softmax -
Table 10: The model architecture used for evaluating
Defense-GAN.
Layer Type Parameters
Dropout 0.2
Convolution + ReLU 64, 8 × 8, 2
Convolution + ReLU 128, 6 × 6, 2
Convolution + ReLU 128, 5 × 5, 1
Dropout 0.5
Fully Connected 10
Softmax -
Table 11: The Model 1 architecture.
Layer Type Parameters
Convolution + ReLU 128, 3 × 3, 1
Convolution + ReLU 64, 3 × 3, 2
Convolution + ReLU 128, 5 × 5, 1
Dropout 0.25
Fully Connected + ReLU 128
Dropout 0.5
Fully Connected 10
Softmax -
Table 12: The Model 2 architecture.
Layer Type Parameters
Fully Connected + ReLU 200
Dropout 0.5
Fully Connected + ReLU 200
Dropout 0.5
Fully Connected 10
Softmax -
Table 13: The Model 3 architecture.
Layer Type Parameters
Fully Connected + ReLU 200
Fully Connected + ReLU 200
Fully Connected 10
Softmax -
Table 14: The Model 4 architecture.
